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This paper considers an endogenous growth model with public capital and government 
debt. In setting the level of public investment each period, the government is assumed to 
follow two fiscal rules that are commonly used in the growth literature: public 
investment is either equal to a constant fraction of output or equal to a constant share of 
tax revenues.  In our model, we allow revenues to be raised by the government through 
progressive income taxation and bonds issue. For both fiscal rules, we show that the 
potential occurrence of either indeterminacy or instability crucially depends on whether 
the government is a debtor or a creditor. In particular, government indebtedness causes 
the economy to be prone to either belief-driven aggregate fluctuations or unstable 
dynamics. This is a novel result in the related literature which has largely overlooked the 
role of public debt as a possible contributing factor to the presence of indeterminacy and 
instability in growth models. Empty 10 
Keywords: Nonlinear Taxation, Endogenous Growth, Indeterminacy 
JEL Classifications:  E62; H41; H30; O40 
1  Introduction 
This paper studies the relationship between public debt and macroeconomic stability in the 
context of a representative agent model of endogenous growth. Modern macroeconomic 
theory has extensively studied the possibility of indeterminacy of equilibrium paths.1 In the 
context of growth theory, indeterminacy can take the form of multiple balanced growth paths 
(global indeterminacy), and/or multiple transition paths all of which converge to the same 
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1 For a concise survey on indeterminacy in macroeconomics, see Benhabib and Farmer (1999). In 
addition, Benhabib and Gali (1995) show that the data is not consistent with the dynamics of growth 
models that exhibit a unique transition path. 
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long-run equilibrium (local indeterminacy). The presence of global indeterminacy may help 
explain why economies with similar fundamentals can have the same per capita income but 
grow at different rates. On the other hand, the presence of local indeterminacy may provide a 
rationale of why economies with the same growth rate can have different per capita levels of 
income.  
The present paper analyzes the possibility of local indeterminacy when it is fiscal policy 
that generates externalities leading to long-run growth. Since the seminal studies of Arrow 
and Kurz (1970), Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), productive public capital has been 
considered as a key determinant of long-run growth. In general, fiscal policy is a key tool at 
the disposal of policymakers that can be used to stimulate growth, but also to ameliorate the 
effects of business fluctuations. Hence, the potential presence of indeterminacy or instability 
should be taken seriously into consideration in the design of fiscal policy since it may have 
significant welfare implications. 
In this paper, we consider an endogenous growth model with public capital, progressive 
income taxation and government debt. We derive analytically the necessary and sufficient 
parametric space that ensures uniqueness of equilibrium (i.e. a unique balanced growth path) 
under two different taxation schemes (flat vs. progressive income taxes) and government 
expenditure rules (public investment expenditure indexed to output vs. public investment 
expenditure indexed to revenues). It is shown that, within this parametric domain, the 
possibility of local indeterminacy arises only when the government is a debtor and indexes 
public investment to tax revenues. In all other cases, the long-run equilibrium is either locally 
determinate in the saddle point sense or unstable.  
Relative to the existing literature, our framework incorporates simultaneously two 
important features of actual fiscal policy: public debt and progressive taxation. As it is 
discussed below when reviewing the related literature, indeterminacy appears to be quite 
prevalent in growth models with a government that maintains a balanced budget in every 
period and uses flat rate taxes to raise revenues. Our analysis shows that progressive taxation 
is not important for the potential occurrence of indeterminacy. On the other hand, the 
presence of debt is a key factor in affecting the dynamics of the economy.  
If the government is a creditor, it is shown that there is no indeterminacy or instability. In 
contrast, if the government is a debtor, then indeterminacy occurs only for a specific subset of 
the parametric space we consider. From this perspective, allowing the government to issue 
bonds or accumulate assets reduces the likelihood of indeterminacy relative to the balanced 
budget case. The only other possibility when the government is a debtor is that the economy 
exhibits unstable dynamics. Hence, the presence of public debt increases the likelihood of 
instability across the various cases considered. The occurrence of instability implies that even 
a small perturbation will cause the economy to permanently deviate from its long-run 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the economy may follow a dynamic path that violates the 
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principles of intertemporal optimization or present value budget constraints. For this reason, 
these outcomes are rendered in the related literature as infeasible.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and discusses 
our contribution. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 defines the balanced growth path 
under the two fiscal rules used to finance public investment. Section 5 studies the transitional 
dynamics of the economy under either fiscal rule. Section 6 provided the main intuition 
behind our results and discusses their policy implications. Section 7 provides a numerical 
illustration of the theoretical results obtained in the previous section. The final section 
concludes. Proofs of the various propositions are relegated to Appendix A. Finally, Appendix 
B presents an extended version of our model. 
2    Related Literature 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) show that a standard one-sector RBC model with constant 
returns-to-scale production technology may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots under a 
balanced-budget rule where fixed public expenditures are financed by proportional taxation 
on total income. Among others, Palivos et al. (2003), Park and Philippopoulos (2004) and 
Chen and Guo (2013a) obtain a similar result in an endogenous growth framework. By 
allowing the government to issue debt, our findings indicate that indeterminacy may occur 
even if the government does not maintain a balanced budget in every period.   
In terms of the tax structure in our model, we assume that the government raises revenues 
using a progressive income tax schedule which is an empirically plausible assumption; see, 
for example, Arnold (2008). Our specification is based on Guo and Lansing (1998) who 
postulate that the tax rate an individual is facing is an increasing function of its taxable 
income relative to a benchmark level of income that is taken as given. Following Greiner 
(2006), this benchmark level corresponds to the average taxable income in the economy in 
our case. Guo and Lansing (1998) show in the context of the exogenous growth neoclassical 
model that a sufficiently progressive income tax schedule can ensure saddle path stability and 
stabilize the economy against sunspot fluctuations. Extending their framework in an 
endogenous growth setting, Chen and Guo (2013a) find that raising the tax progressivity may 
actually destabilize the economy with fluctuations driven by agents’ self-fulfilling 
expectations. In contrast to both studies, we find that the degree of progressivity of the tax 
schedule does not make the economy more or less susceptible to indeterminacy. 
In our model, we consider two fiscal rules that have been adopted in the related theoretical 
literature. The first rule is based on Devereux and Love (1995) and Turnovsky (2000), and 
indexes public investment every period to output. The second rule follows Greiner and 
Semmler (2000) and Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004), and indexes public investment to the tax 
revenues that are raised by the government every period. We show that, under either of these 
two rules, a unique balanced growth path equilibrium exists. However, these rules differ in 
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terms of the possible stance of the government as a debtor or a creditor in the long-run 
equilibrium. It is shown that when public investment is indexed to tax revenues, the 
government is always a debtor. In contrast, when public investment is indexed to output, then 
the government can be either a debtor or a creditor. In turn, whether the government is a 
borrower or a lender determines the presence or absence of indeterminacy and instability in 
our model.           
The paper closest to ours is that of Greiner (2006). The author develops an endogenous 
growth model with public capital, progressive taxation and government debt. The model is 
used to derive the necessary conditions for the existence of a sustainable balanced growth 
path. Furthermore, the author uses numerical methods to analyze the effects of changing the 
slope of the tax schedule on the dynamics of the economy and the long-run growth rate. 
However, there are two major differences between our work and Greiner’s. First, the 
author assumes that the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic in consumption. This is 
only a special case of the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution (CEIS) utility 
function used in our specification. Second, Greiner assumes that the ratio of the primary 
surplus to output is a positive linear function of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We do not impose 
such a restriction. Instead, we consider two alternative fiscal rules. The first rule keeps the 
share of public investment in output constant. The second rule assumes that the share of 
public investment in total tax revenues remains fixed.2  
In some earlier work on indeterminacy, Palivos et al. (2003) generalize the model of Barro 
(1990) by introducing an endogenous labor supply decision. It is shown that a continuum of 
equilibria and global indeterminacy can arise for reasonable parameter values. The public 
input that generates economy-wide increasing returns is a flow variable, while in our case it is 
a stock variable. Furthermore, the government finances the public production services through 
a flat income tax maintaining a balanced budget throughout, while in our model the 
government uses a progressive income tax schedule and issues debt.    
Park and Philippopoulos (2004) use a standard one-sector endogenous growth model with 
inelastic labor supply, in which the government uses a flat income tax to finance public 
production and consumption services. They show that two balanced growth paths exist with 
substantially different properties: a low-tax and high-growth equilibrium, and a high-tax and 
                                                 
2 This difference in specification is crucial, because it affects the transition path of the economy to the 
balanced growth path equilibrium. In Greiner’s study, it is the transition path of public capital that 
adjusts to the dynamics of public debt: according to the author’s fiscal rule, an increase in debt causes 
a reduction in public investment which reduces the stock of public capital. In our case, the causality 
runs the other way round: it is the transition path of public debt that adjusts to the dynamics of public 
capital. In other words, an increase in public investment causes an increase in debt under either of the 
two fiscal rules we consider (see equation (33) and footnote 5 below). This factor becomes important 
in our case because, in order for indeterminacy to be present, we require public capital to increase 
causing the after-tax return on capital to rise and, thus, validating the households’ expectations. 
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low-growth equilibrium. Furthermore, there can also be an infinite number of transition paths 
all of which converge to either of the two long-run equilibria described above. In other words, 
the framework of Park and Philippopoulos allows for the presence of both global and local 
indeterminacy, while in our case only local indeterminacy is possible. Their framework 
differs from ours in two main aspects. First, their specification involves two types of 
expenditures financed through a flat tax with the government always maintaining a balanced 
budget. In contrast, we consider only one type of expenditure that is financed through a 
progressive income tax while, at the same time, the government can issue debt. Second, these 
authors conduct their analysis on indeterminacy based on an endogenously determined fiscal 
policy, while in our case fiscal policy is exogenous. 
More recently, Chen and Guo (2013a) examine the interaction between economic growth 
and indeterminacy in a one-sector representative agent model of endogenous growth with a 
flow of productive public spending and nonlinear income taxation. The authors distinguish 
between two effects of an increase in government purchases: the demand-side effect, captured 
by the ratio of government purchases to output along the balanced growth path, and the 
supply-side effect, captured by the output elasticity of productive spending. It is shown that, if 
the supply-side effect outweighs the demand-side effect, then the economy exhibits an 
indeterminate balanced growth path equilibrium when the tax schedule is sufficiently 
progressive or regressive. On the other hand, when the supply-side effect is weaker, then 
indeterminacy arises under progressive income taxation. Compared to their work, we 
constrain ourselves to progressive taxation which is empirically prevalent relative to 
regressive taxation. Furthermore, we allow the government to issue debt and treat productive 
spending as a stock instead of a flow variable.  
3    The Model 
Consider a decentralized closed economy with three sectors: the household sector, which 
consists of a unit measure of identical infinitely-lived households, a production sector and the 
government. First, we describe the production sector which is represented by a single firm 
that behaves competitively and maximizes static profits. The aggregate production technology 
is given by: 
𝑄(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐾(𝑡)ଵିఈ൫𝐿𝐺(𝑡)൯ఈ                                             (1) 
where 𝑄 denotes output, 𝐾 and 𝐺 represent the stock of private and public capital at time 𝑡, 
respectively, 𝐿 is the aggregate labor supply, 0 < 𝛼 < 1/2 denotes the output elasticity with 
respect to public capital and 𝐴 > 0 is a scaling parameter. Public capital is assumed to be a 
non-rival and non-excludable public good that is labor-augmenting. The specification of 
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production function (1) implies that households supply labor inelastically. For simplicity, 
aggregate labor supply 𝐿 is normalized to unity.  
The optimality conditions for profit maximization by the firm yield the wage rate 𝜔(𝑡) 
and real interest rate 𝑟(𝑡), respectively: 
𝜔(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐴𝐾(𝑡)ଵିఈ𝐺(𝑡)ఈ                                                       (2) 
𝑟(𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝐾(𝑡)ିఈ𝐺(𝑡)ఈ                                                (3) 
Note that optimality condition (3) implies that the depreciation rate of private capital is 
assumed to be zero.3 
Τhe government’s flow budget constraint is given by: 
𝐵ሶ (𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑇(𝑡) + 𝐼 (𝑡)                                            (4) 
where 𝐵ሶ (𝑡) denotes the rate of change in the stock of public debt 𝐵(𝑡), 𝑇(𝑡) represents the 
income tax revenues collected by the government and 𝐼 (𝑡)  is expenditure on public 
investment. The public debt accumulation equation (4) implies that the rate of return on 
government bonds 𝑟(𝑡) is equal to the rental rate of private capital.  
Two alternative schemes are considered regarding the financing of public investment. 
Based on the studies by Devereux and Love (1995) and Turnovsky (2000), the first scheme 
sets public investment every period equal to a constant fraction 0 < 𝜓ଵ < 1 of aggregate 
output. Formally: 
𝐼 (𝑡) = 𝐺ሶ (𝑡) = 𝜓ଵ𝐴𝐾(𝑡)ଵିఈ𝐺(𝑡)ఈ                                           (5) 
Since public investment is indexed to output, we will refer to the policy rule given by 
expression (5) as FRO. Note that expression (5) implies that, as in the case of private capital, 
the depreciation rate of public capital is assumed to be zero. 
Following Greiner and Semmler (2000) and Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004), the second 
financing scheme sets public investment every period equal to a constant fraction 0 < 𝜓ଶ < 1 
of tax revenues collected by the government: 
𝐼 (𝑡) = 𝐺ሶ (𝑡) = 𝜓ଶ𝑇(𝑡)                                                (6) 
                                                 
3 The sole purpose of this assumption is to ease exposition. Our numerical simulations, as described in 
Section 7, show that our results extend to the case in which the depreciation rates of private and 
public capital are strictly positive. Appendix B provides a brief description of the extended version of 
our model that includes the two depreciation rates. 
ANGYRIDIS, TSINTZOS      Public Investment and Debt 
 
 127
Since public investment is indexed to taxes, we will refer to the policy rule given by 
expression (6) as FRT.  
The government raises revenues to finance public investment and service its debt by 
taxing the income earned by the households from supplying labor and holding assets: 
𝑇(𝑡) = 𝜏(𝑡)൫𝜔(𝑡) + 𝑟(𝑡)𝑊(𝑡)൯                                        (7) 
where 𝑊(𝑡) denotes wealth. The latter is the sum of private capital stock and government 
bond holdings of households: 
𝑊(𝑡) = 𝐾(𝑡) + 𝐵(𝑡)                                                   (8) 
Let 𝑦(𝑡) = 𝜔(𝑡) + 𝑟(𝑡)𝑊(𝑡) denote the income that the representative household earns in 
period 𝑡  and 𝑌(𝑡)  the economy-wide average income. Every period, the representative 
household faces a nonlinear income tax schedule given by: 
𝜏(𝑡) = 1 − 𝜂 ቀ௒(௧)௬(௧)ቁ
ఝ                                                    (9) 
where the parameters 𝜂 ∈ (0,1ሿ and 𝜑 ∈ [0,1)  represent the level and slope of the tax 
schedule, respectively. The above specification for 𝜏(𝑡) is adopted from Guo and Lansing 
(1998) and Greiner (2006). Chen and Guo (2013b) apply the nonlinear least squares 
methodology of Cassou and Lansing (2004) and obtain year-by-year empirical estimates of 
the level and slope of tax schedule (9) based on the U.S. federal individual income tax 
schedule for the period 1966-2005. These estimations result in an average R-square of 0.867. 
Hence, this specification captures well the progressive nature of the tax code of an advanced 
economy such as the United States.    
Note that in the case when 𝜑 > 0, tax rate 𝜏(𝑡)  is monotonically increasing with the 
agent’s income 𝑦(𝑡). In other words, if income at time 𝑡 is above 𝑌(𝑡), then the household 
faces a higher tax rate compared to the case when income is below 𝑌(𝑡). Hence, expression 
(9) represents a progressive income tax schedule. 
By setting 𝜑 = 0 and 𝜂 = 1 − 𝜏  in (9), the progressive tax scheme collapses to a flat 
(constant) tax rate which is typically assumed in the growth literature. In this case, the 
representative household faces the constant tax rate 1 − 𝜂 regardless of the level of 𝑦(𝑡). Note 
also that in the presence of a progressive income tax schedule, the average and marginal tax 
rates do not coincide. In particular, the marginal tax rate which affects intertemporal decisions 
is equal to:  
𝜏௠(𝑡) = డ൫ఛ(௧)௬(௧)൯డ௬(௧) = 1 − 𝜂(1 − 𝜑) ቀ
௒(௧)
௬(௧)ቁ
ఝ                               (10) 
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The marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate since the latter is given by: 
𝜏௔(𝑡) =
𝜏(𝑡)𝑦(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡) = 1 − 𝜂 ቆ
𝑌(𝑡)
𝑦(𝑡)ቇ
ఝ
 
The objective of the representative household is to choose a consumption allocation over time 
in order to maximize the present value of lifetime utility:  
maxሼେ(୲),୛(୲)ሽ U൫C(t)൯ = ׬ eି஡୲ େ(୲)
భషಚିଵ
ଵି஢ dt
ஶ
଴                             (11) 
subject to the flow budget constraint: 
Wሶ (t) = ൫1 − τ(t)൯൫ω(t) + r(t)W(t)൯ − C(t)                             (12) 
where 𝑊ሶ (𝑡) denotes the change of wealth over time, 𝐶(𝑡) is consumption at time 𝑡, 𝜌 > 0 is 
the household’s subjective discount rate, 𝜎 > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution and 𝜏 is given by (9).  
Making use of tax schedule (9) and the definition of income 𝑦(𝑡), the present value 
Hamiltonian for the representative agent’s problem is given by: 
𝐻(𝑡) = 𝑒ିఘ௧ ஼(௧)భష഑ିଵଵିఙ + 𝑞(𝑡) ቂ𝜂 ቀ
௒(௧)
ఠ(௧)ା௥(௧)ௐ(௧)ቁ
ఝ ൫𝜔(𝑡) + 𝑟(𝑡)𝑊(𝑡)൯ − 𝐶(𝑡)ቃ     (13) 
where 𝑞(𝑡) denotes the co-state variable associated with the wealth accumulation equation 
(12). The optimality conditions for this intertemporal maximization problem are: 
q(t) = eି஡୲C(t)ି஢                                                         (14) 
and 
−qሶ (t) = η(1 − φ)q(t)r(t) ቀ ଢ଼(୲)ன(୲)ା୰(୲)୛(୲)ቁ
஦                            (15) 
Combining (14) with (15) and using (10) yields the Euler equation: 
஼ሶ(௧)
஼(௧) =
(ଵିఛ೘)௥(௧)ିఘ
ఙ                                                 (16) 
which describes the evolution of consumption over time. Finally, we impose the standard 
transversality condition on the household’s asset holdings: 
lim௧→ஶ 𝑞(𝑡)𝑊(𝑡) = 0                                                   (17) 
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4    Equilibrium Conditions and the Balanced Growth Path 
An equilibrium allocation is defined as an allocation in which the firm maximizes profits, 
both private factors of production earn their marginal product (equations (2) and (3)), 
households maximize (11) subject to (12), and the budget constraint of the government (4) is 
satisfied. Furthermore, we consider a symmetric equilibrium such that 𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑌(𝑡) = 𝑄(𝑡) +
𝑟(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) holds.  
Combining equations (2)-(4), (7), (10), (12), (16) and either fiscal rule (5) or fiscal rule 
(6), allows us to derive an autonomous system of differential equations that completely 
describes the dynamics of the economy. For both fiscal rules, the growth rate of consumption 
is given by:4 
஼ሶ
஼ = ቀ
ଵ
ఙቁ ቂ(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑)𝜂𝐴𝐺ఈ𝐾ିఈ ቀ
௒
௬ቁ
ఝ − 𝜌ቃ                         (18) 
With respect to fiscal rule FRO (equation (5)), the remainder of the dynamic system is as 
follows: 
 
𝐵ሶ
𝐵 = 𝐴 ൬
𝐺
𝐾൰
ఈ
 ቈ(𝜓ଵ − 1) ൬
𝐾
𝐵൰ + 𝜂 ൬1 − 𝛼 +
𝐾
𝐵൰ ൬
𝑌
𝑦൰
ఝ
቉                      (19) 
𝐺ሶ
𝐺 = 𝜓ଵ𝐴 ൬
𝐾
𝐺൰
ଵିఈ
                                             (20) 
𝐾ሶ
𝐾 = (1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴 ൬
𝐺
𝐾൰
ఈ
− 𝐶𝐾                                        (21) 
On the other hand, the corresponding equations for the growth rates of public debt, public 
capital and private capital for fiscal rule FRT (equation (6)) are: 
𝐵ሶ
𝐵 = 𝐴 ൬
𝐺
𝐾൰
ఈ
൥൬𝛼 − 1 − 𝐾𝐵൰ ൭(𝜓ଶ − 1)𝜂 ൬
𝑌
𝑦൰
ఝ
− 𝜓ଶ൱ −
𝐾
𝐵൩                  (22) 
𝐺ሶ
𝐺 = 𝜓ଶ𝐴 ൬
𝐺
𝐾൰
ఈ
൤(1 − 𝛼) ൬𝐵𝐺൰ +
𝐾
𝐺൨ ቈ1 − 𝜂 ൬
𝑌
𝑦൰
ఝ
቉                         (23) 
𝐾ሶ
𝐾 = −
𝐶
𝐾 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝜓ଶ ൬
𝐵
𝐾൰ ൬
𝐺
𝐾൰
ఈ
ቈ1 − 𝜂 ൬𝑌𝑦൰
ఝ
቉ + 𝐴 ൬𝐺𝐾൰
ఈ
ቈ1 − 𝜓ଶ ቆ1 − 𝜂 ൬
𝑌
𝑦൰
ఝ
ቇ቉          (24) 
                                                 
4 From this point on, the time argument t will be omitted unless there is a possible ambiguity. 
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A balanced growth path (BGP) is defined as a long-run equilibrium in which all endogenous 
variables grow at the same rate. Formally, 
𝐶ሶ
𝐶 =
𝐾ሶ
𝐾 =
𝐺ሶ
𝐺 =
𝐵ሶ
𝐵 = 𝛾 
where 𝛾 > 0 denotes the economy’s growth rate. 
In order to analyze the dynamics of the model economy around a BGP, we define the 
following variables: 𝑐 ≡ 𝐶/𝐾, 𝑏 ≡ 𝐵/𝐾, and 𝑔 ≡ 𝐺/𝐾. Differentiating these variables with 
respect to time and using the fact that 𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑌(𝑡)  yields a three-dimensional system of 
differential equations for each fiscal rule considered. In particular, when public investment is 
indexed to output (FRO), the dynamic system is given by:  
𝑐ሶ
𝑐 = −
𝜌
𝜎 + 𝑐 + ൬
1
𝜎൰ [𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑) − 𝜎(1 − 𝜓ଵ)ሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈ                     (25) 
𝑏ሶ
𝑏 = 𝑐 − (1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔
ఈ − ൬1𝑏൰ (1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔
ఈ                (26) 
𝑔ሶ
𝑔 = 𝑐 + 𝜓ଵ𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ − (1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔ఈ                                                  (27) 
On the other hand, when public investment is indexed to tax revenues (FRT), the dynamic 
system is as follows: 
𝑐ሶ
𝑐 = −
𝜌
𝜎 + 𝑐 + ൬
1
𝜎൰ (𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑) − 𝜎 + 𝜎(1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ[1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏ሿ)𝐴𝑔
ఈ         (28) 
𝑏ሶ
𝑏 = 𝑐 − ൣ1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜂 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ൫1 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝑏)൯൧𝐴𝑔
ఈ  − ൬1𝑏൰ (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)𝐴𝑔
ఈ  (29) 
𝑔ሶ
𝑔 = 𝑐 + (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ[1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏ሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ  − [1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ(1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏)ሿ𝐴𝑔ఈ    (30) 
The following proposition refers to the existence and uniqueness of the balanced growth path 
equilibrium for both fiscal policy rules under consideration. 
Proposition 1 Under policy rule FRO, the dynamic system (25)-(27) has a steady state that 
is unique for any 𝜎 > 0 and regardless of whether 𝑏 is positive or negative. Under policy 
rule FRT, the dynamic system (28)-(30) has a steady state that is unique if 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑 and 
𝑏 > 0. 
PROOF: See Appendix A.1. 
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For comparison purposes, we consider the flat tax specification that is commonly used in the 
related literature. In discussing this special case, we set 𝜑 = 0 and 𝜂 = 1 − 𝜏  in dynamic 
systems (25)-(27) and (28)-(30). Corollary 1 refers to the existence and uniqueness of a 
balanced growth path equilibrium for both expenditure rules under a flat tax system. 
Corollary 1 With a flat tax, the dynamic system (25) - (27) under policy rule FRO has a 
steady state that is unique. On the other hand, under policy rule FRT and a flat tax rate, the 
dynamic system (28)-(30) has a steady state that is unique if 𝜎 > 1. 
PROOF: The values for the slope and level of the tax schedule required in order for tax 
schedule (9) to collapse to a flat tax rate are included in the range of values considered for 
these two parameters in Proposition 1. Therefore, the results of this proposition apply to this 
special case as well.  
∎ 
Along the BGP, if 𝑟 < 𝛾, then the economy is dynamically inefficient under both fiscal rules, 
implying that the government can play a Ponzi game. Therefore, we only consider the case 
𝑟 > 𝛾. Corollary 2 determines the parametric restriction required for the allocation in the 
long-run equilibrium to satisfy this property. 
Corollary 2 If 𝜎 > (1 − 𝜑)𝜂, then for both fiscal rules along the BGP 𝑟 > 𝛾.  
PROOF: Recall that Euler equation (18) is common for both fiscal rules. Evaluating this 
optimality condition along the BGP and given that we would like to show that 𝑟 > 𝛾, it 
follows that 
𝑟 ቈ1 − (1 − 𝜑)𝜂𝜎 ቉ > −
𝜌
𝜎 
A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that 𝜎 > (1 − 𝜑)𝜂.  
∎ 
Furthermore, we note that the two fiscal rules have different implications in terms of the 
stance of the government as a debtor or a creditor. Corollary 3 refers to this property of the 
long-run equilibrium under either rule. 
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Corollary 3 Assume that 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑. Under the FRO rule, the government can be either a 
creditor or a debtor along the BGP. In contrast, the government can only be a debtor along 
the BGP in the case of the FRT rule. 
PROOF: Evaluating (4) along the BGP under the FRO rule and rearranging, yields 
(𝜂𝑟 − 𝛾) 𝐵𝑄 = 1 − 𝜓ଵ − 𝜂 
Substituting for 𝑟 and 𝛾 into 𝜂𝑟 − 𝛾 yields: 
𝜂𝑟 − 𝛾 = 𝜂(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑔ఈ ቈ𝜎 − (1 − 𝜑)𝜎 ቉ +
𝜌
𝜎 
Given that 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑, it follows that 𝜂𝑟 > 𝛾. Hence, 𝐵 ≷ 0 when 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 ≶ 1. Therefore, 
in this case, the government can be either a creditor or a debtor in the long-run equilibrium. 
Similarly, evaluating (4) along the BGP under the FRT rule implies that: 
ൣ𝑟൫𝜂 + 𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝜂)൯ − 𝛾൧
𝐵
𝑄 = (1 − 𝜓ଶ)(1 − 𝜂) 
Substituting for 𝑟 and 𝛾 into the term inside the brackets yields: 
𝑟൫𝜂 + 𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝜂)൯ − 𝛾 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑔ఈ ቈ
𝜂൫𝜎 − (1 − 𝜑)൯ + 𝜎𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝜂)
𝜎 ቉ +
𝜌
𝜎 
Once again, given that 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑, it is the case that 𝑟൫𝜂 + 𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝜂)൯ > 𝛾. Since the right-
hand side of the above expression is positive, it follows that 𝐵 > 0. Thus, in contrast to the 
FRO rule, the government is always a debtor under the FRT rule.  
■ 
Note that, given 0 < 𝜂 < 1, the parametric condition 𝜎 > (1 − 𝜑)𝜂  in Corollary 2 is less 
stringent than the condition 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑 required for both rules in Corollary 3. Furthermore, it 
satisfies the parametric condition required for the FRT rule in Proposition 1. On the other 
hand, the parametric condition in Corollary 2 imposes a lower bound on the value of the 
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution required for the FRO rule in Proposition 
1 (𝜎 > 0). For these reasons, we will assume for the remainder of our analysis that 𝜎 > 1 −
𝜑.  
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5    Dynamic Analysis 
In this section, we discuss the possibility of indeterminacy in the parametric domain 
considered in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2. A steady state or balanced growth path 
equilibrium is said to be indeterminate if there exists a non-degenerate interval Ω such that for 
every initial condition of the predetermined variables 𝑏(0) and 𝑔(0) and the jump variable 
𝑐(0) ∈ Ω, the economy converges to the same long-run equilibrium. In contrast, when there is 
a unique transition path to the steady state or balanced growth path equilibrium, then we have 
determinacy.  
The concept of indeterminacy implies the existence of infinite transition paths converging 
to the same long-run equilibrium. This implies that in order to obtain a determinate long-run 
equilibrium we need to establish the parametric conditions under which there exists a unique 
saddle path. For this to be the case, the number of stable (negative) eigenvalues should be 
equal to the number of predetermined variables. In our model, we have two predetermined 
variables, 𝑏(𝑡) and 𝑔(𝑡), and one jump variable, 𝑐(𝑡). Therefore, for the long-run equilibrium 
under either fiscal policy rule established in Proposition 1 to be determinate we require that 
we have two stable (negative) eigenvalues. In contrast, the presence of three negative 
eigenvalues gives rise to indeterminacy. In all other cases, the long-run equilibrium is 
unstable in the sense that a perturbation from the BGP will cause the economy to permanently 
deviate from it.  
Proposition 2 below considers the possibility of indeterminacy for the fiscal policy rule 
under which public investment expenditure is indexed to output (FRO). 
Proposition 2 Consider the parametric domain established in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 
for policy rule FRO. Within this domain, dynamic system (25) - (27) has one negative and 
one positive eigenvalue in the neighborhood of its steady state. If 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 < 1, then the third 
eigenvalue is positive and the BGP is unstable. On the other hand, when 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 ≥ 1, the 
third eigenvalue is negative and we have determinacy. 
PROOF: See Appendix A.2. 
Note that an implication of Proposition 2 is that, when 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 ≥ 1, the long-run equilibrium 
is stable in the saddle point sense. Furthermore, from Corollary 3, it follows that the 
government in this case is a creditor. On the other hand, when 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 < 1  the BGP is 
unstable and, as it has been shown in Corollary 3, the government in this case is a debtor. 
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Next, we turn our attention to the policy rule that indexes public investment expenditure to 
tax revenues (FRT). Proposition 3 below considers the potential presence of indeterminacy or 
instability in this case. 
Proposition 3 Consider the parametric domain established in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 
for policy rule FRT. Within the specific parametric domain, dynamic system (28) - (30) 
exhibits either instability or indeterminacy.  
PROOF: See Appendix A.3. 
6    Discussion 
To understand the intuition behind our results regarding the potential presence of 
indeterminacy, assume that starting from an initial position for the economy households form 
optimistic beliefs about future economic activity. These beliefs manifest themselves by a 
higher expected after-tax rate of return on their wealth. Acting upon their rosy expectations 
about the future, households begin to consume less and save more today.  
What differentiates our framework from other studies in the related literature is the 
presence of a second asset that households can invest in apart from private capital: bonds 
issued by the government. In making their investment decisions, households internalize the 
fact that an expansion in economic activity that is consistent with their optimistic beliefs will 
allow the government to allocate more resources towards increasing the stock of public 
capital. For this reason, households prefer to invest more in bonds rather than capital.  
An implication of this is that, following the agents’ formation of optimistic beliefs, the 
stock of public capital rises faster than the stock of private capital in the long run. As a 
consequence, the public-to-private capital ratio increases causing the economy’s long-run 
growth rate to rise (see equation (18)), while the debt-to-private capital ratio rises as well (see 
equation (A.3) in the case of the FRT rule).5 Furthermore, the increase in 𝑔 causes the after-
tax rate of return on wealth to rise. Hence, in this case, the agents’ initial optimistic 
expectations are validated and the economy’s expected transition path becomes a self-
fulfilling equilibrium. 
                                                 
5 A similar positive relation between the two ratios holds in the case of the FRO rule when the 
government is a creditor. Combining (25) and (26) after having been evaluated along the BGP and 
totally differentiating yields: 
𝑑𝑏
𝑑𝑔 =
𝛼𝜌
(1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝜎𝐴 𝑏
ଶ𝑔ି(ଵାఈ), 
   which is positive if the government is a debtor (𝜓ଵ < 1 − 𝜂) and negative if it is a creditor (𝜓ଵ > 1 −
𝜂). 
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A requirement for this case to materialize is that the government supplies bonds that are 
available for purchase by the households. In other words, the government is a debtor. If the 
government is a creditor instead, then households acting upon their optimistic beliefs will 
invest in private capital. In this case, the stock of public capital does not rise faster that the 
stock of private capital. As a consequence, the after-tax rate of return on wealth does not 
increase in the long run and the rosy expectations of consumers do not become self-fulfilled. 
This is the reason why indeterminacy can possibly occur only with a debtor government.  
On the other hand, the presence of a creditor government leads to determinacy in our 
model. As it was shown in Corollary 3, this can only occur if the government follows the 
FRO rule. Following Proposition 2, the condition for indeterminacy requires that the fraction 
of output allocated to public investment is larger than the average tax rate: 𝜓ଵ ≥ 1 − 𝜂. The 
condition for determinacy is a natural one: for every dollar raised in revenues by the 
government, a larger fraction can be allocated towards public investment. In other words, the 
government can afford to allocate more resources to public investment per dollar raised as 
revenue relative to a debtor government which has to use a portion of its revenues to service 
its debt.  
As it is stated in Propositions 2 and 3, the potential presence of instability also arises in 
our model. In this case, a perturbation from the BGP causes the economy to permanently 
deviate from it. In terms of the dynamics of the economy, instability leads to infeasible 
solutions; see, for example, Greiner and Semmler (1996).6 As in the case of indeterminacy, 
the choice of the fiscal stance made by the government can prevent these outcomes from 
occurring. A creditor government following the FRO rule never causes the economy to 
become unstable. On the other hand, an economy with a debtor government following the 
same fiscal rule as in the previous case is always unstable.  
7    Quantitative Analysis 
In this section, we provide a numerical illustration of the theoretical results derived in the 
previous sections for the two fiscal rules. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. The 
objective of our parameterization is to closely match the historical post-WWII averages of 
three ratios: (i) the debt-to-private capital ratio (𝑏), (ii) the public-to-private capital ratio (𝑔), 
and (iii) the consumption-to-private capital ratio (𝑐).  
Using data that cover the period 1946-2006, Atolia et al. (2011) determine that the ratio of 
public-to-private capital is roughly equal to 0.5070. Based on data obtained from the National 
                                                 
6 These solutions include, for instance, the violation of transversality conditions, corner solutions with 
economically nonsensible values (e.g. zero consumption) or trajectories that are permanently gyrating 
around the BGP with no tendency to converge back to it.  
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Income and Product Accounts provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that 
cover the period 1961-2010, we calculate the average consumption-to-output ratio to be 
0.6577. Atolia et al. (2011) calculate the ratio of private capital-to-output to be 2.17. 
Combining these two figures implies that in the long-run equilibrium the consumption-to-
private capital ratio is equal to 0.3031. Finally, regarding the target value of the debt-to-
private capital ratio, we use data from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) covering the period 1973-2015 to obtain an average value for the 
federal debt held by the public as a percentage of GDP of 0.4086. Combining this figure with 
the estimate of the private capital-to-output ratio provided by Atolia et al. (2011) yields a 
value of 𝑏 in the long-run equilibrium of 0.1883.  
In growth and business cycle theory, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution represents 
perhaps the most crucial parameter since it captures the willingness of households to 
substitute consumption between periods in response to changes in the after-tax interest rate. In 
order to assign a value to this parameter in our case, we follow Havranek et al. (2015) who 
use meta-regression analysis to obtain estimates of this elasticity for a large panel of 
countries. Based on 1429 published studies for the United States on this topic, these authors 
obtain an estimate of this elasticity of 0.594 with a standard error of 0.036. For this reason, we 
set the value of the inverse of this elasticity (𝜎) equal to 1.68. 
In terms of the coefficients in policy rules (5) and (6), we use annual data for the gross 
domestic product, current tax receipts and gross government investment of the U.S. economy. 
This data covers the period 1969-2014 and is also obtained from the National Income and 
Product Accounts. The average gross domestic product during the sample period is $7,456.6 
billion, while the average tax receipts and gross government investment are $1,449.0 and 
$310.6 billion, respectively. Based on these values, we set 𝜓ଵ = 0.04 and 𝜓ଶ = 0.21. In other 
words, gross government investment is on average equal to 4% of GDP, or alternatively, 21% 
of tax revenues. 
Regarding the elasticity of output with respect to public capital, we follow Atolia et al. 
(2011) and set 𝛼 equal to 0.10. With respect to the parameters of the progressive income tax 
schedule (9), we set 𝜂 = 0.837 and 𝜑 = 0.05. Both values are close to the ones estimated by 
Chen and Guo (2013b) using U.S. federal individual income tax data over the period 1966-
2005. The total factor productivity parameter 𝐴 varies between the two fiscal rules. For the 
FRO rule we set it equal to 0.4002, while for the FRT rule we assign a value of 0.3668. 
Finally, considering a value for 𝜌 of 0.20, the above parameterization allows us to obtain 
values for the 𝑏, 𝑔 and 𝑐 ratios that closely match their average postwar values for both rules. 
Table 1 below reports the values of the three ratios obtained from the data and the values 
obtained from solving for the BGP equilibrium of each fiscal rule.  
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Table 1: Ratios 𝒃, 𝒈 and 𝒄  
Ratio Data FRO FRT 
𝑏 0.1883 0.1824 0.1825 
𝑔 0.5070 0.5070 0.5070 
𝑐 0.3031 0.3022 0.3021 
Note that the above parameterization of the model satisfies the restrictions stated in 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 2. Furthermore, in all numerical examples performed, we verify 
that along the BGP it is the case that the public-to-private capital ratio exceeds its threshold 
level 𝑔෤ and that 𝑟 > 𝑔. 
Regarding the FRO fiscal rule, our parameterization implies that 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 = 0.877 < 1. 
This is consistent with Corollary 3 since we require the government to be a debtor along the 
BGP. It follows from Proposition 2 that the dynamic system (25) - (27) is unstable. This is 
confirmed numerically since there is one negative eigenvalue (-0.0869) and two positive ones 
(0.9638 and 1.3826). Regarding the FRT fiscal rule, recall that according to Proposition 3 the 
dynamic system (28) - (30) may exhibit either instability or indeterminacy. Based on our 
parameterization, there is one negative eigenvalue (-0.0788) and two positive ones (0.9429 
and 1.3585). Hence, it is confirmed that the long-run equilibrium is unstable.  
As a numerical example to illustrate the robustness of our results, we reconsider the FRO 
rule by keeping 𝜂 fixed at 0.837 and setting 𝜓ଵ equal to 0.21. This ensures that  𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 > 1, 
which from Corollary 3 implies that the government is a creditor instead of a debtor. Hence, 
in contrast to the case of using the calibrated value of 𝜓ଵ, the dynamic system (25) - (27) 
should be saddle-path stable. Consistent with Proposition 2, in this case there is one positive 
eigenvalue (0.9903) and two negative ones (-3.3317 and -0.0474). Finally, in agreement with 
Corollary 3, the government is a creditor with 𝑏 = −0.0767 < 0 along the balanced growth 
path. 
Next, we examine the sensitivity of our results with respect to the value of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For each rule, we use our calibrated parameters and 
vary only the value of 𝜎. Tables 2 and 3 below report the 𝑏, 𝑔 and 𝑐 ratios, as well as the 
corresponding eigenvalues for the FRO rule and the FRT rule, respectively. Note that in both 
cases, we consider values for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that 
satisfy the condition 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑. 
The relationship between two of the eigenvalues and parameter 𝜎 is qualitatively similar 
for both rules. Eigenvalue 𝜆ଵ  lies in the negative quadrant and is strictly increasing with 
respect to 𝜎. In contrast, eigenvalue 𝜆ଷ takes values in the positive quadrant but it is also 
strictly increasing. On the other hand, the behavior of eigenvalue 𝜆ଶ differs between the two 
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Table 2: FRO Sensitivity analysis with respect to 𝝈 (𝒃 > 𝟎) 
𝜎 𝑏 𝑔 𝑐 𝜆ଵ 𝜆ଶ 𝜆ଷ 
0.96 0.2042 0.2650 0.2835 -0.2845 0.9779 1.0337 
1 0.2027 0.2730 0.2859 -0.2687 0.9752 1.0518 
2 0.1848 0.4568 0.3228 -0.0971 0.9555 1.3333 
5 0.1731 0.9400 0.3649 -0.0230 0.9662 1.6334 
10 0.1688 1.6623 0.3941 -0.0075 0.9777 1.8204 
Table 3: FRT Sensitivity analysis with respect to 𝝈 (𝒃 > 𝟎) 
𝜎 𝑏 𝑔 𝑐 𝜆ଵ 𝜆ଶ 𝜆ଷ 
0.96 0.1923 0.3502 0.2791 -0.1691 0.9413 1.1996 
1 0.1915 0.3595 0.2809 -0.1603 0.9416 1.2107 
2 0.1802 0.5721 0.3090 -0.0615 0.9441 1.4074 
5 0.1720 1.1197 0.3432 -0.0157 0.9572 1.6429 
10 0.1686 1.9239 0.3681 -0.0053 0.9677 1.7997 
 
rules. In the case of the FRO rule, it is U-shaped and lies in the positive quadrant, while in the 
case of FRT rule it increases as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution falls. Regardless of 
these differences, the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 are consistent with Proposition 3: a 
debtor government results in a long-run equilibrium that is unstable for both rules. 
For completeness, we consider also the case of a creditor government which, according to 
Corollary 3, applies only to the case of the FRO rule. Keeping our benchmark 
parameterization unaltered with the exception of 𝜓ଵ, which is set equal to 0.20, we solve for 
the BGP and the corresponding eigenvalues for the same values of 𝜎 as in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 4 below summarizes these calculations.    
Comparing the last three columns with those in Table 2 shows that the fiscal stance of the 
government has no qualitative effect on eigenvalues 𝜆ଵ and 𝜆ଶ. On the other hand, 𝜆ଷ now 
takes values in the negative quadrant instead of the positive one, while it is strictly increasing 
with 𝜎 instead of decreasing. 
The above sensitivity analysis with respect to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
shows that its value is important only for the existence of a unique BGP and to ensure that the 
long-run equilibrium is dynamically efficient. However, it appears to play no role in terms of 
making instability or indeterminacy more or less likely. The latter depends only on whether 
the government is a debtor or a creditor. Comparing Tables 2 and 3, as 𝜎 increases, then for 
both rules 𝑏  falls, 𝑔  rises and 𝑐  increases. As the public-to-private capital ratio increases, 
equation (3) implies that the interest rate increases as well in both cases. The only difference 
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Table 4: FRO Sensitivity analysis with respect to 𝝈 (𝒃 < 𝟎) 
𝜎 𝑏 𝑔 𝑐 𝜆ଵ 𝜆ଶ 𝜆ଷ 
0.96 -0.0694 0.9095 0.2300 -0.1190 0.9979 -3.0482 
1 -0.0685 0.9400 0.2336 -0.1117 0.9968 -3.1406 
2 -0.0585 1.6623 0.2862 -0.0369 0.9892 -4.5595 
5 -0.0530 3.6205 0.3390 -0.0081 0.9918 -5.9941 
10 -0.0512 6.6233 0.3722 -0.0025 0.9947 -6.8324 
 
is that for the FRO rule the growth rate rises (from 5.3% to 10.1%), while for the FRT rule it 
falls (from 3.8% to 0.8%). For both rules, the growth rate is determined by equation (18). 
Given that 𝑔 rises with 𝜎, it must be the case that the rate of increase in the public-to-private 
capital ratio is sufficiently lower under the FRT rule compared to the FRO rule, thus, causing 
a reduction in the growth rate instead of an increase. 
Finally, we explore numerically the robustness of our results by allowing the depreciation 
rates of private and public capital to be strictly positive instead of being zero. The version of 
the model that includes the two depreciation rates and is used in our dynamic analysis is 
presented in Appendix B. Relative to the our initial calibration scheme, we leave the values of 
𝜎, 𝜓ଵ and 𝜓ଶ unchanged. The remaining parameters are appropriately adjusted to ensure that 
the model closely matches the 𝑏, 𝑔 and 𝑐 ratios for both rules.  
In particular, we adopt the following parameterization for the FRO rule: 𝛼 = 0.3, 𝜌 =
0.12, 𝜑 = 0.25, 𝜂 = 0.9 and 𝐴 = 0.5188. In addition, we set the depreciation rate of private 
capital, 𝛿௄, equal to 0.11, while the depreciation rate of public capital, 𝛿ீ, is assumed to be 
equal to 0.03. Similarly, we use the following parameter values for the FRT rule: 𝛼 = 0.26, 
𝜌 = 0.12 , 𝜑 = 0.21 , 𝜂 = 0.8795 , 𝐴 = 0.5068 , 𝛿௄ = 0.11  and 𝛿ீ = 0.01 . Note that the 
values of the depreciation rates are close to the ones adopted by Atolia et al. (2011). Table 5 
below reports the values of the three ratios obtained from the data and the values obtained 
from solving for the BGP equilibrium of each fiscal rule.  
In the spirit of Proposition 2, since the government is a debtor in the long-run equilibrium, 
we expect the corresponding dynamic system to be unstable under the FRO rule. This 
expectation is validated since there is only one negative eigenvalue (-0.1413) and two positive 
ones (0.8248 and 0.9109). Regarding the FRT rule, there are also two positive eigenvalues 
(0.8212 and 0.9340) and one negative (-0.0982). Hence, the BGP exhibits instability in this 
case as well. This result is consistent with the predictions of Proposition 3.7  
                                                 
7 The numerical results reported in this section, as well as an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect 
to our parameterizations, are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 5: Ratios 𝒃, 𝒈 and 𝒄 with depreciation rates  
Ratio Data FRO FRT 
𝑏 0.1883 0.1803 0.1977 
𝑔 0.5070 0.5070 0.5070 
𝑐 0.3031 0.3080 0.3031 
8    Conclusions 
We consider an endogenous growth model with public capital, progressive income taxation 
and government debt. We derive analytically the necessary and sufficient parametric space 
that ensures uniqueness of equilibrium under two government expenditure rules: a rule that 
indexes public investment to output and a rule that indexes productive spending to tax 
revenues.  
It is shown that the transitional dynamics of the economy crucially depend on whether the 
government is a debtor or a creditor in the long-run equilibrium. In particular, when the 
government is a creditor, the long-run equilibrium is always locally determinate. Based on 
Corollary 3, the government can be a creditor only in the case that it indexes public 
investment expenditure to output. On the other hand, a government can be a debtor under 
either fiscal rule. Public indebtedness gives rise to a rich set of possible dynamics. If a debtor 
government indexes productive spending to output, then the long-run equilibrium exhibits 
instability. Alternatively, if the government indexes public investment expenditure to tax 
revenues, then the balanced growth path equilibrium can be either locally indeterminate or 
unstable. Hence, overall, public indebtedness leads to indeterminacy or instability with the 
latter outcome occurring with a higher likelihood.    
In addition, the degree of progressivity of the income tax schedule does not appear to 
influence the possibility of the model exhibiting indeterminacy or not. Finally, in terms of 
implications regarding policy design, our results suggest that a government should prefer a 
fiscal rule that ties public investment to output, rather than tax revenues, and be a creditor 
rather than a debtor. Otherwise, the economy will be susceptible to either belief-driven 
aggregate fluctuations or unstable dynamics. 
Motivated by the substantial accumulation of sovereign debt during the recent global 
economic downturn, Woo and Kumar (2015) revisit the relationship between public 
indebtedness and growth. In particular, they provide concrete evidence on the significant 
adverse impact of initial high public debt on subsequent growth over the next 5-20 years (or 
longer) based on a large panel of advanced and emerging economies for the period 1970-
2008. In obtaining this result, the authors apply a large variety of econometric techniques, 
control for a substantial number of variables that potentially affect long-term growth and 
perform a battery of robustness checks. They also detect the presence of a nonlinearity with 
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higher levels of initial debt above 90% of GDP having more significantly negative effects on 
subsequent growth. The policy implications of our model are consistent with the robust 
empirical findings of Woo and Kumar (2015). Furthermore, these implications concur with 
the results of Fatás and Mihov (2003) based on data for 91 countries that excessive 
discretionary fiscal policy leading to the accumulation of debt induces significant 
macroeconomic instability and lowers economic growth. 
The present framework can be extended in several ways. A possibility involves 
introducing labor-leisure choice as in Chen and Guo (2013b). Building on the model in Chen 
and Guo (2013a), these authors show that their model economy exhibits indeterminacy and 
sunspots if the equilibrium after-tax wage-hours locus is positively sloped and steeper than 
the household’s labor supply curve. Another possible extension involves examining 
indeterminacy in the context of a two sector model as in Chang et al. (2015). These authors 
examine the interaction between the composition of government expenditures and equilibrium 
indeterminacy in a two sector model with productive externalities in investment. They find 
that the economy is more susceptible to indeterminacy and sunspots when the output fraction 
of government purchases of investment goods is relatively small. We are planning to pursue 
these extensions in future research.  
Appendix A 
A.1  Proof of Proposition 1  
Recall that based on the model’s specification, 0 < 𝛼 < 1/2 , 0 < 𝜂 < 1 , 𝜎 > 0 , 𝜌 > 0 , 
𝐴 > 0 , 0 < 𝜑 < 1 , 0 < 𝜓ଵ < 1 , and 0 < 𝜓ଶ < 1 . For both policy rules, we constrain 
ourselves to a nonnegative long-run growth rate: 𝛾 ≥ 0. Evaluating Euler equation (18) along 
the BGP, it follows that the public capital-to-private capital ratio should satisfy: 
𝑔 ≥ ൤ 𝜌(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑)𝜂𝐴൨
ଵ
ఈ ≡ 𝑔෤ > 0 
Note that this threshold level for 𝑔 is common for both expenditure rules.  
We next turn to showing existence and uniqueness of a BGP. First, consider the policy 
rule that indexes public investment expenditure to output (FRO). Setting (25) equal to zero, 
solving for 𝑐 and inserting it into (27) with 𝑔ሶ 𝑔⁄ = 0 yields: 
 
𝑓(𝑔) = 𝜌𝜎 −
1
𝜎 [𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑)ሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈ + 𝜓ଵ𝐴𝑔ఈିଵ = 0               (𝐴. 1) 
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It follows that for any 𝑔 ∈ [𝑔෤, +∞): 
𝑓ᇱ(𝑔) = −(1 − 𝛼) ൬𝛼𝜎 𝜂(1 − 𝜑) +
𝜓ଵ
𝑔 ൰ 𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ < 0 
Furthermore, it can be easily seen that lim௚→଴ 𝑓(𝑔) = +∞ and lim௚→ାஶ 𝑓(𝑔) = −∞. Hence, 
function 𝑓(𝑔) is continuously differentiable and monotonically decreasing for 𝑔 ∈ [𝑔෤, +∞). 
This implies that there exists a unique positive 𝑔ො that solves (A.1). Given 𝑔ො, we can solve for 
?̂? from equation (25) and, then, for 𝑏෠ from equation (26) after setting 𝑏ሶ 𝑏 = 0⁄ . Thus, a unique 
BGP exists.  
Next, consider the policy rule that indexes public investment expenditure to tax revenues 
(FRT). Setting (28) equal to zero, solving for 𝑐 and substituting it into (30) with 𝑔ሶ 𝑔 = 0⁄  
yields: 
𝑓(𝑔, 𝑏) = 𝜌𝜎 −
1
𝜎 [𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑)ሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈ + (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ[1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏ሿ𝐴𝑔ఈିଵ = 0     (𝐴. 2) 
Notice that for a given public-to-private capital ratio 𝑔, 𝑓(∙) is a linear function of the public 
debt-to-private capital ratio. This is in contrast to the previous case where function 𝑓(∙) is 
independent of 𝑏.  
In addition, evaluating (29) along the BGP and substituting for 𝑐 from (28) we obtain: 
 
𝑏ିଵ = 𝜌 𝜎⁄(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)𝐴𝑔ఈ +
(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଶ
1 − 𝜓ଶ +
𝜂(1 − 𝛼)
(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ) ൤1 −
1 − 𝜑
𝜎 ൨      (𝐴. 3) 
 This expression implies that the public-to-private capital ratio is positively related to the 
debt-to-private capital ratio. Intuitively, government bonds are an asset from the perspective 
of the household. As debt issue by the government increases, household’s wealth increases as 
well. However, the household’s wealth is a source of revenue for the government. It follows 
that an increase in wealth leads to an increase in the tax revenues collected by the 
government. Under fiscal rule FRT, public investment is equal to a fraction of tax revenues. 
Hence, the rise in revenues causes public investment to increase. This leads to a higher 
accumulation of public capital causing the public-to-private capital ratio to increase.   
Assuming that 𝑏 > 0, the sign of equation (A.3) clearly depends on the sign of the last 
term. It follows that a sufficient condition for the public debt-to-private capital ratio to be 
positive for any 𝑔 ∈ [𝑔෤, +∞) is that 𝜎 > 1 − 𝜑. 
Differentiating (A.2) with respect to 𝑔 taking 𝑏 as given yields: 
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𝜕𝑓(𝑔, 𝑏)
𝜕𝑔 = −(1 − 𝛼) ൭൬
1
𝜎൰ 𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑) + (1 − 𝜂)[1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏ሿ ൬
𝜓ଶ
𝑔 ൰൱ 𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ < 0 
Furthermore, it can be easily seen that lim௚→଴ 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑏) = +∞ and lim௚→ାஶ 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑏) = −∞.  
These results imply that there exists a unique positive pair ൫𝑔ො, 𝑏෠൯ that solves (A.2) and (A.3). 
Given 𝑔ො and 𝑏෠, we can solve for ?̂? from equation (28). Thus, a unique BGP exists.  
∎ 
A.2   Proof of Proposition 2  
The Jacobian of system (25) - (27) is 
𝐽 =
⎣
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎡1 0 [𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑) − 𝜎(1 − 𝜓ଵ)ሿ𝛼𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ
𝜎
1 (1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔
ఈ
𝑏ଶ −(1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝛼𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ − (1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝛼𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ
𝑏
1 0 −(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଵ𝐴𝑔ఈିଶ − 𝛼(1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔ఈିଵ ⎦
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎤
 
 
Let 𝑇𝑟(𝐽) and 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) denote the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix, respectively. 
The characteristic polynomial is given by: 
𝑓(𝜆) = −𝜆ଷ + 𝑇𝑟(𝐽)𝜆ଶ + 𝐴𝑔ఈିଶΓ𝜆 + 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = 0 
where 
𝑇𝑟(𝐽) = 1 − [(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଵ + 𝛼(1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝑔ሿ𝐴𝑔ఈିଶ +
(1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔ఈ
𝑏ଶ  
𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = − (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)(𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑)𝑔 + 𝜎𝜓ଵ)𝜎𝑏ଶ 𝐴
ଶ𝑔ିଶ(ଵିఈ) 
and 
Γ ≡ (1 − 𝛼)[𝜎𝜓ଵ + 𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑)𝑔ሿ𝜎 −
(1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)ൣ𝑔ଶ − ൫(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଵ + 𝛼(1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝑔൯𝐴𝑔ఈ൧
𝑏ଶ  
The corresponding eigenvalues are: 
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𝜆ଵ =
(1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔ఈ
𝑏ଶ  
and 
𝜆ଶ,ଷ =
𝜎ൣ𝑔ଶ − ൫(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଵ + 𝛼(1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝑔൯𝐴𝑔ఈ൧ ± Δ
2𝜎𝑔ଶ  
where 
Δ ≡ ට𝜎 ቀ4(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑔ఈାଶ(𝜎𝜓ଵ + 𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑)𝑔) + ൣ𝑔ଶ − ൫(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଵ + 𝛼(1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝑔൯𝐴𝑔ఈ൧ଶቁ 
Consider the product of 𝜆ଶ and 𝜆ଷ: 
𝜆ଶ𝜆ଷ = −
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜎𝜓ଵ + 𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑)𝑔ሿ
𝜎 𝐴𝑔
ఈିଶ < 0 
It follows that there is always one negative and one positive eigenvalue. Hence, whether there 
is determinacy or not depends on the sign of 𝜆ଵ . If 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 < 1, then this eigenvalue is 
positive and the BGP is unstable. In contrast, when 𝜓ଵ + 𝜂 ≥ 1, then 𝜆ଵ < 0 and we have 
determinacy. 
∎ 
A.3   Proof of Proposition 3  
The Jacobian of system (28) - (30) is 
𝐽 = ൥
𝑎ଵଵ 𝑎ଵଶ 𝑎ଵଷ
𝑎ଶଵ 𝑎ଶଶ 𝑎ଶଷ
𝑎ଷଵ 𝑎ଷଶ 𝑎ଷଷ
൩ 
where 
𝑎ଵଵ = 𝑎ଶଵ = 𝑎ଷଵ = 1 
𝑎ଵଶ = (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ𝐴𝑔ఈ 
𝑎ଵଷ = ൬
1
𝜎൰ (𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑) − 𝜎 + 𝜎(1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ[1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏ሿ)𝛼𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ 
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𝑎ଶଶ = ൤(1 − 𝛼)𝜓ଶ + ൬
1
𝑏ଶ൰ (1 − 𝜓ଶ)൨ (1 − 𝜂)𝐴𝑔
ఈ 
𝑎ଶଷ = − ቈൣ1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜂 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ൫1 + (1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝑏)൯൧ + ൬
1
𝑏൰ (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)቉ 𝛼𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ 
𝑎ଷଶ = (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ𝐴𝑔ఈ ൬1 +
1
𝑔൰ 
and 
𝑎ଷଷ = −(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ[1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏ሿ𝐴𝑔ఈିଶ − 𝛼[1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ(1 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏)ሿ𝐴𝑔ఈିଵ 
Let 𝑇𝑟(𝐽) and 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) denote the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix, respectively. 
The characteristic polynomial is given by: 
𝑓(𝜆) = −𝜆ଷ + 𝑇𝑟(𝐽)𝜆ଶ + Ζ𝜆 + 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = 0                           (𝐴. 4) 
where 
𝑇𝑟(𝐽) = 1 + 𝑎ଶଶ + 𝑎ଷଷ 
𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = 𝑎ଵଷ(𝑎ଷଶ − 𝑎ଶଶ) + 𝑎ଵଶ(𝑎ଶଷ − 𝑎ଷଷ) + 𝑎ଶଶ𝑎ଷଷ − 𝑎ଶଷ𝑎ଷଶ 
and 
Z ≡ 𝑎ଵଶ + 𝑎ଵଷ − 𝑎ଶଶ + 𝑎ଶଷ𝑎ଷଶ − 𝑎ଷଷ − 𝑎ଶଶ𝑎ଷଷ 
In contrast to the previous case, we cannot obtain a closed form solution for the eigenvalues 
of the dynamic system. However, we can infer their sign by applying Descartes’ rule of signs 
in polynomial equations. The determinant of the Jacobian matrix can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = 𝜈଴(𝜈ଵ + 𝜈ଶ) 
where 
𝜈଴ ≡ −
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜂)𝐴ଶ𝑔ିଶ(ଵିఈ)
𝜎𝑏ଶ < 0 
𝜈ଵ ≡ (1 − 𝜓ଶ)[𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑)𝑔 + (1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝜓ଶ + (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝜓ଶ𝑏ሿ > 0 
and 
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𝜈ଶ ≡ (1 − 𝛼)𝛼𝜓ଶ[(1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝜓ଶ + 𝜂(𝜎 + 𝜑 − 1)ሿ𝑏ଶ − 𝛼(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)𝜎𝜓ଶ𝑏 
Regarding the sign of 𝜈ଶ, we can show that is negative. Rearranging (33) yields: 
1
𝑏 −
(1 − 𝛼)[𝜎𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝜂) + 𝜂(𝜎 + 𝜑 − 1)ሿ
𝜎(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ) =
𝜌 𝜎⁄
(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)𝐴𝑔ఈ > 0 
From the inequality involving the term on the left-hand side of the above expression, it 
follows that: 
𝑏 < 𝜎(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)(1 − 𝛼)[𝜎𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝜂) + 𝜂(𝜎 + 𝜑 − 1)ሿ 
Multiplying both sides by 𝑏 > 0 and 0 < 𝛼𝜓ଶ < 1, and then rearranging implies that 𝜈ଶ < 0. 
Based on the above result, it follows that the sign of the determinant depends on whether the 
sum 𝜈ଵ + 𝜈ଶ is positive or negative. Using expression (A.3) to obtain 𝑏, substituting it into 𝜈ଵ 
and 𝜈ଶ, and adding these two terms yields: 
𝜈ଵ + 𝜈ଶ = (1 − 𝜓ଶ)[𝛼𝜂(1 − 𝜑)𝑔 + (1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝜓ଶሿ +
𝜅ଵ
𝜅ଶ 
where 
𝜅ଵ ≡ 𝐴൫𝜎(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)൯ଶ𝜓ଶ𝑔ఈሼ(1 − 2𝛼)𝜌 + 𝐴(1 − 𝛼)ଶ[𝜂(𝜎 + 𝜑 − 1) + (1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝜓ଶሿ𝑔ఈሽ 
and 
𝜅ଶ ≡ [𝜌 + (1 − 𝛼)[𝜂(𝜎 + 𝜑 − 1) + (1 − 𝜂)𝜎𝜓ଶሿ𝐴𝑔ఈሿଶ 
The first term of the sum 𝜈ଵ + 𝜈ଶ is positive. Furthermore, since 𝜎 + 𝜑 > 1 from Proposition 
1 and 𝛼 < 1/2, it follows that 𝜅ଵ 𝜅ଶ > 0⁄ . Hence, 𝜈ଵ + 𝜈ଶ > 0 which, in turn, implies that 
𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) < 0. 
In applying Descartes’ rule of signs, we first consider polynomial (A.4) as it stands 
without changing the sign of 𝜆. This is referred to as the “positive” case. Table A.1(a) below 
displays all possible sign combinations of the coefficients as well as the number of sign 
changes from positive to negative and vice versa. In addition, we consider polynomial (A.4) 
having changed the sign of 𝜆. This is referred to as the “negative” case and Table A.1(b) 
displays all possible sign combinations of the coefficients as well as the number of sign 
changes. 
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Based on Tables A.1(a) and A.1(b), it follows that the dynamic system (28) - (30) has 
either one or three negative eigenvalues. If there is a single negative eigenvalue, then the BGP 
is unstable. On the other hand, if there are three negative eigenvalues, then the system is 
locally indeterminate.  
∎ 
Table A.1(a): Positive Case 
𝑓(𝜆) = −𝜆ଷ + 𝑇𝑟(𝐽)𝜆ଶ + Ζ𝜆 + 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = 0 
−𝜆ଷ 𝑇𝑟(𝐽) Ζ 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) Sign Changes 
- - - - 0 
- - + - 2 
- + + - 2 
- + - - 2 
Table A.1(b): Negative Case 
𝑓(−𝜆) = 𝜆ଷ + 𝑇𝑟(𝐽)𝜆ଶ − Ζ𝜆 + 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) = 0 
𝜆ଷ 𝑇𝑟(𝐽) Ζ 𝐷𝑒𝑡(𝐽) Sign Changes 
+ - - - 1 
+ - + - 3 
+ + + - 1 
+ + - - 1 
Appendix B 
This appendix provides a brief description of the model that includes nonzero depreciation 
rates for private (𝜹𝑲) and public capital (𝜹𝑮). Relative to the version of the model presented 
in Section 2, the key difference is the resulting change in the expressions for the before-tax 
rate of return to capital and the two fiscal rules. In particular, equation (3) becomes: 
𝑟(𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝐾(𝑡)ିఈ𝐺(𝑡)ఈ − 𝛿௄                                 (𝐵. 1) 
while the expressions for the FRO (equation (5)) and FRT (equation (6)) rules are now given 
by:            
𝐼 (𝑡) = 𝐺ሶ (𝑡) + 𝛿ீ𝐺(𝑡) = 𝜓ଵ𝐴𝐾(𝑡)ଵିఈ𝐺(𝑡)ఈ                      (𝐵. 2) 
and 
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𝐼 (𝑡) = 𝐺ሶ (𝑡) + 𝛿ீ𝐺(𝑡) = 𝜓ଶ𝑇(𝑡)                                 (𝐵. 3) 
respectively. Note that the common for both expenditure rules threshold level of the public-
to-private capital ratio stated in Proposition 1 that ensures a nonnegative long-run growth rate 
is now expressed as: 
𝑔 ≥ ቈ 𝜌 + 𝛿௄(1 − 𝜑)𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑)𝜂𝐴቉
ଵ
ఈ
≡ 𝑔෤ > 0 
Following steps similar to the ones described in Sections 3 and 4, we obtain the dynamic 
systems for the two fiscal rules used in the simulations reported in Section 7. When public 
investment is indexed to output (FRO), dynamic system (25) - (27) is replaced by: 
𝑐ሶ
𝑐 = −
𝜌
𝜎 + 𝑐 + 𝛿௄ ൬
1
𝜎൰ [𝜎 − 𝜂(1 − 𝜑)ሿ + ൬
1
𝜎൰ [𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑) − 𝜎(1 − 𝜓ଵ)ሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈ                (𝐵. 4) 
𝑏ሶ
𝑏 = 𝑐 + 𝛿௄(1 − 𝜂) − (1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔
ఈ + ൬1𝑏൰ [𝛿௄(1 − 𝜂) − (1 − 𝜂 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔
ఈሿ      (𝐵. 5) 
and 
𝑔ሶ
𝑔 = 𝑐 + 𝛿௄ − 𝛿ீ + 𝜓ଵ𝐴𝑔
ఈିଵ − (1 − 𝜓ଵ)𝐴𝑔ఈ                      (𝐵. 6) 
On the other hand, when public investment is indexed to tax revenues (FRT), dynamic system 
(28) - (30) becomes: 
𝑐ሶ
𝑐 = −
𝜌
𝜎 + 𝑐 + ൤1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ(1 + 𝑏) − ൬
1
𝜎൰ 𝜂(1 − 𝜑)൨ 𝛿௄ 
+ ൤൬1𝜎൰ 𝜂(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜑) − (1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ) + (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ(1 − 𝛼)𝑏൨ 𝐴𝑔
ఈ             (𝐵. 7) 
𝑏ሶ
𝑏 = 𝑐 + (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 2𝜓ଶ)𝛿௄ − [1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜂 − (2 − 𝛼)𝜓ଶሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈ 
+ ൬1𝑏൰ (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜓ଶ)(𝛿௄ − 𝐴𝑔
ఈ) − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ𝑏(𝛿௄ − (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑔ఈ)      (𝐵. 8) 
and 
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𝑔ሶ
𝑔 = 𝑐 + ൤1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ(1 + 𝑔) ൬
1 − 𝑏
𝑔 ൰൨ 𝛿௄ − 𝛿ீ − [1 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶሿ𝐴𝑔
ఈ 
+(1 − 𝜂)𝜓ଶ[1 − (1 − 𝛼)(1 + 𝑔)𝑏ሿ𝐴𝑔ఈିଵ          (𝐵. 9) 
It is straightforward to show that dynamic systems (B.4) - (B.6) and (B.7) - (B.9) collapse to 
systems (25) - (27) and (28) - (30), respectively, if one sets 𝛿௄ = 𝛿ீ = 0. 
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